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Super K Rides Again 
U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger 
has achieved another spectacular effort 
in international peace making. This time, 
he has performed his miracle in southern 
Africa. Within a matter of days, Kissinger 
accompl ished what years of guerrilla 
struggle could not . A peaceful se ttl ement 
in amibia (South-West Afri ca) a.nd an 
agreement for Black majority rule in 
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). 
At least this is the conclusion that the 
capitalist news media in this country 
wou ld have us be lieve. Upon closer in-
:;peaion however, the situation changes 
i:lrastically. What we see is a group of 
white racist and U.S. imperialists who are 
trying to desperately save Sout h Africa 
and themselves from total da mnation by 
imposing a neo-colonial solution in Zim-
babwe and split the southern African 
liberation movements. 
In recent years it did not seem as if the 
U.S. had a foreign policy toward Africa, 
but this is hardly the case. U.S. imperialist 
policy has always been to keep Africa 
within the grips of imperialism and to 
support ands rengthen racism and reac-
tion. South Africa has always been the 
main p illar of U.S. policy in Southern 
Africa whi le the former Portuguese col-
onialists acted as U.S. proxy in Africa . The 
most recent example of the U.S. sideing 
with reaction and colonialism was their 
open support of racism and reaction in 
Angola. It was the U.S. who fin anced the 
Portuguese in Angola and the CIA that 
created the F, LA and U ITA to figh t the 
people s moveme n led by the M PLA. The 
U.S. supported the South Africa n troops 
under the old cold war (boague) of fi ght-
i r-ig communism while denouncing 
So iet aid and the Cuban troops who 
defended the right of the African people 
to independence. 
Socialist help of the MPLA to secure 
and build a nation reflects the Leninist 
principle o f the interconnection be-
,,.., een the fig ht fo r social ism and the fight 
fo r na1ional li beration. The principle 
position of the Soviet L'nion, Cuba and 
the other Socialist countries vis-a-vis 
Angola has set another precedent in that 
international progressive forces will unite 
to fight imperialism. Despite the fact 
MPLA was not backed by Western 
powers they received world wide recog-
nition as the one true liberation force 
fighting for Angola's freedom.This was a 
great setback for the U.S. and Kissinger's 
foreign policy. The Vietnamese, the USSR 
and the Cubans were being congratu-
!ated for their assistance to Angola. The 
U.S. was lost, scorned and embittered. 




But the West had to do something. 
SWAPO (South West People's Organiza-
tion) and the guerrilla fighters i11 Zim-
babwe were winning victory after victory. 
The U.N. had already recognized SWAPO 
as the only political force in Namibia. The 
Ian Smith regime did not know how 
much longer they could depend upon 
the Black soldiers in their Rhodesian 
army to continue to fight for them while 
their brothers and sisters the freedom 
fighters, were gaining victories for the 
liberation of Zimbabwe. Colonialism was 
being crushed from all sides. More im-
portantly South Africa was losing the 
ground to win friends in Africa through 
its infamous racist detente policies. Plus 
the two independent states of Angola 
and Mozambique could now provide a 
training ground for the freedom fighters 
of South Africa and directly threaten 
South Africa . President Samora Machel 
of Mozambique made no bones about 
telling the imperialist that Mozambique 
and other African nations would come to 
the aid of the liberation forces in south-
ern Africa. Militarily the imperialist could 
not win short of more aggressive military 
action from the capitalist nations. Thus 
they were forced with another tactic. 
Diplomacy. What could be more diplo-
matic to save South Africa and racist rule 
in Namibia and Zimbabwe than the U.S. 
meeting with all sides to come to a 
·'peaceful settlement" in Rhodesia and 
Namibia? In other words the possibility 
of sacrificing Rhodesia and Namib ia to 
p reserve South Africa. Possibly they 
~o~!d regai~ control in "legalized pirat-
ing and split the southern African liber-
ation movements. 
MIDDLE EAST "SOLUTION" 
These were the reasons why Mr. Kis-
singer embarked on a "diplomatic 
shuttle" to visit the heads of the African 
states during the mid part of this year. He 
denounced in mild terms apartheid, and 
called for Black majority rule in Rho-
(Continued on page 4) 
The armed liberation struggle in Zimbabwe 
ha, taken on new dimension; through the 
important ad ·ance; made b, rhr- rreedom 
figh ters o e1 tne fa eight months. Very linle 
is known about the libeTation army in Zim-
babwe since most of the attention has been 
rocused on a political ,e1tlemen1 of the Zim-
baowe situation. Howe er. lt ~ because of-the 
armed struggle and their successes that has 
caused the discussion by the imperialist on 
finding a polit,ca! ,olurion 10 majoril) rule in 
Zimbabwe. The fighting continues in Zim~ 
babwe in spite of the Kissinger so called 
"shuttle diplomacy". Zimbabwe will be llber-
ated b, the strength of the war !or freedom 
and n01 given 10 rhe Zimbabweans b\' Kiss in -
ger or Ian Smith. In the first oubl-ic co.mments 
made by a member of the ieadership of the 
Zimbabwe People"s Army (ZIPA). he MoLlm-
bique. Information Agency [Al I imerviewed 
Dz.inashe Machingura, Deput} Political Com-
'missar of ZlPA. ZIPA is the organization that is 
carrying out thn war in Zimbabwe against Ian 
Smith's illegal regime and the following inter-
view is an abbreviated version given to AIM 
l;ite in Sentember 197f; -rA 
Q. What is the Zimbabwe People's Army 
and how was it formed? 
A. The Zimbabwe People' s Army is .; 
product of the voluntary merger of the 
military wing of the form er ZAN U 
(ZA LA) and the military wing of the 
former ZAP (ZIPRA). I was formed for 
1he purpose of rescuing the Zimbabwe 
libe.ra1ion stru_g_gle from1rechaotic5itua -
tion that had been created by the ANC 
leadership. It is an armed body of men, 
which was formed for the purpose of 
resuming the armed struggle, intensify-
ing this armed struggle .and carrying it to 
its logical conclusion and finally estab-
lishing a just and popular socio-political 
order serving the interests o the people 
of Zimbabwe. 
After the Lusaka agreement in De-
cember 1974 the four nationalist organi-
sations fighting for the libera tion of Zim-
babwe came 1oge1her under one um-
brella , the ANC. But in the course of 
1ime, the leadership which was formed at 
that time through the Lusaka agreement 
fa il ed to organise itself in negotiating 
with the Smith regime and failed 10 set in 
motio n machinery that would pursue 
and realise the liberation of Zimbabwe 
through armed struggle. 
After the fighters had reali ed the in-
competence of the A C leadershipthey 
took it upon themselves to organise 
them elves, to reconstitute themsel es 
into an army that would fight for the 
independence of the Zimbabwe people. 
The combatants from both former ZA U 
and former ZAPU agreed to form a jo int 
military comm.and that would lead the 
armed struggle. After this agreemen1 
the approached the Liberation Com-
mittee of the Organisation of African 
Unity and the front-line Heads of State. 
• I ~as r 1,1 \i c.. i' n-1 c:::....E··. ~ 
who appreciated and active! supponed 
this joint military command. 
The joint military command was 
formed on he understanding that the 
liberation of Zimbabwe could only be 
realised through an arduous armed 
struggle; secondly, on the understanding 
that the lraditional political leaaership of 
Zim babwe had divided the people of 
Zimbabwe. And it became quite clear to 
us that if we were e er going ro be able 
to prosecute a successfu l armed struggle 
we could not be a party to ei her of the 
two rival ANC factions, the Muzorewa 
faction or the Nkomo faction. We re-
alised •hat the time for personality pol-
itics had long passed. It was this approach 
to politics which had divided the Zim-
babwe people. 
Q. Is ZIPA only an army, or does it have a 
political structure and leadership? 
A. ZIPA is an army in the traditional 
sense of the word. But ZIPA is a unique 
and revolutionary army in the sense that 
it has a strategic role of transforming 
itself into a political movement. The ZIPA 
structure accommodates the shou ldering 
of both the military and the pol itical tasks 
of the revolution. We have, wi hin the 
ZI PA structure, a political department 
exclusively charg_ed with rhe responsibil-
ity of shouldering the political rasb that 
are normally shouldered by a revolution-
ary political organiz.ation. 
In the history of re olutionary 
struggles we find eXamples that closely 
approximate our own situation. For ex-
ample, in the course of their strugg les, at 
one time or another, depending on the 
stage of their revolution, the political 
leadership was identical to the military 
leadership of the organisations fighting 
for freedom in Ch ina, in Cuba, in Korea ,' 
in Vietnam and in many other countries. 
But we have to establish a formal polit-
ical structure in order to give better 
political direaion to the armed body that 
is now fighting inside Zimbabwe. And 
mo es to do this are already well under-
way, moves lo transform this organisation 
into a revolutionary va nguard for the 
people's strugge. 
" c-··,... ~ uU 
Q. Whar are che pol111cal goals of the 
51ru?glel For e ·ample, ZIPA is figh ting 
fo r freedom bu1 ho\ do you define this 
freedom? 
A. We are not mercenaries. We are not 
simpl oldier . We are political soldiers. 
We are fi ghtin for dearl defined polit-
ica l objectives. Our political goal is 10 
overthrow na1ional oppression in Zim-
babwe, to put an end to the system ol 
exploitation of the many by the vew and 
to create a system that wiil -e.rve the 
people of Zimbabwe. When we sa. that 
ZIPA is fighting or freedom we mean 
that ZIPA is fighting for political freedom. 
B political freedom we mean that ZIPA 
is fighting for the political rights, he 
economic rights and the cultural rights of 
the Zimbabwean people; to put the 
Zimbabwean people in a position of 
au tho rity and in a position of dominance 
in these spheres. Through realising the 
people's democratic freedoms we re-
lease and set in motion the innovative 
and creative potential of the masses of 
Zimbabwe. 
Q. Has it been possible to establish lib-
erated or sem i -Liberated zones in 
Zimbabwe? 
A. We can say that at this stage we have 
managed to es abl ish semi-liberated 
zones in the sense that, although the 
politica l and administ rative. infrastructure 
is not yet fully organised, the enemr has 
no control whatsoe er in these are.as. The 
masses are fully mobil ised and organised, 
and are full y behind the armed struggle 
that is no being waged by the fr eedom 
fighters. We also feel that establishing 
liberated areas a this stage would be 
presenting the enemy with many targets 
vulnerable to air strikes. 
Q. /! is clear that since the beginning ol 
this year the ZIPA forces have stepped up 
the armed struggle. Has chis been done 
only in terms of the geographical area 
affected by the war, tha1 is to say, is ir 
only a matLer of extending the war to ci 
wider area, or has the war been intensi-
fied in the sen.Se of achieving higher 
combat effectiveness? 
A. It is true that there has been consider-
able expansion of the geographical area 
covered by our guerrilla struggle. But the 
quantitative growth of the war has also 
gi en rise to the qualitative development 
and transformation o f this same war. This 
has become necessary in accordance 
with the changes in the enemy's situa-
tion. The enemy is now generally on the 
defensi e . The enemy has now employed 
the stra egy of not dispersing its forces, 
so as to minimise the danger of ambushes 
on patrols and to minimise the dangers of 
surpri.5e attacks on small encamped units 
wirhout permanent fortification. This has 
:1.}iL:2'::, I- ...,. __ ;..:.-1 ~:.· ·.: \.: '--: ''!'"' > .. -. ~- , ,._ , 
deplo: ib force;, ir. bi; rnr.,c,vs. To con-
tinue the \\·ar we have to de,elop it to a 
siace of attacking the garrisoned enemy, 
and to raise the level oi tactics to am-
bu,hi n large enem\ con,oy~. Tnere-1ore 
there \•,·as an 1mpera11,e need 1or d quai-
l at ive change in our tru1;gle . Th is we 
have realised and carried o u thro ugh 
opera1ing in bigger miii tary un its, which 
has been impossible because of the 
qualitat i e development of the. con-
sciousness oi rhe masses, who are serving 
as our camouflage. as our intelligence 
system and as our quartermasters. 
Q. But hundreds of thousands of p eople 
have been moved imo concentration 
camps in Zimbabwe. This mun create 
problems when the people wan co help 
the guerrillas. How do Lhe fi hiers and 
the- people deal with this problem? 
A. Mass participation and mass support 
in guerrilla warfare is an indispensable 
condition for victory. It is the strategk 
aim of the Smith regime, like its prede-
ce~ors in Vietnam, Mozambiq ue , An-
gola and other coun tries, to try to isolate 
the guerrillas from the masses by es-
tablishing concentration camps, the so-
called "protected villages" . However, the 
Smith regime has now overtaxed its man-
power to such an extent that it doesn't 
have adequate manpower to police the 
concentration camps. So there are always 
loopholes. 
O ur struggle is a popular struggle, and 
it enjoys abundant support from the 
broad masses of the Zimbabwean peo-
ple. We have a fairly large army, which 
runs into thousands. Without the support 
of the masses it would be very difficult to 
maintain such a big army. We get food, 
clothing and whatever kind of assistance 
we need from the masses. Some govern-
ments find it a burden to maintain an 
army onl half the size of ours. But we are 
capable of mamtaining this army because 
of the support we get from the broad 
masses of the people. 
Q. The Smith regime 's war com-
muniques announce their casualties in 
terms o( one or two deaths in an act.ion. 
They have never admitted losing more 
than five soldiers in a single day. Does 
this bear any relation to the real situa-
tion? 
A. ot at all. It is merely a camouflage to 
disguise their losses. If they were 10 admit 
the truth it would demoralise their sup-
porters and their fighters. So they try as 
much as possible to minimi5e their losses 
and at the same time to exaggerate those 
of the guerrillas. 
Q. There have been some reports about 
Israeli military co-operarion with the 
-Smith regime. Have you any concrete 
information about this? 
A. It is not only the Israelis who are co-
operating with the Smith racist regime in 
~ L l ~ t..., .:...i'..: ·(.-2··..:. ::
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fr "l"' a ,a~ie;, o' \\,·,;::--,,. cour,tr;e, ,·,ho 
are- acti-.el\ a~~1mrig iht Srr,ith r~girne in 
oppre .,;n ' 1he Zimbab~~ ean people. So 
we don't ~ee th is in isolation \o\e know, 
we ha·,e e\ idence 1ha; there are mercen -
aries irom Israel and ma nv other coun-
tries operati ng with Smith agai nst us. 
Q. Ooe5 Zf PA roday have any relarion-
ship to the traditional nationalist organ-
isa tions oi Zimbabwe? 
A. ZIPA is not in negation to the former 
traditiona l oreanisations in Zimbabwe. 
What Z.IPA ai-;m at is assimilating , syn-
thesing and espousing the progressive 
revolutionary content of these former 
organisations. 
Q. \l\lhar is the basis of disunity among 
the former leaders of the nationalist 
org_anisarions? Is it tribal, politica l or 
what? 
A. As far as we are concerned, the basis 
.of disunity among the former leaders of 
the nationalist organizations is political 
ambition and power struggle, though this 
might manifest itself as tribal differences 
or polit1cal differences. Tribal, in the 
sense tha1 in creating a power base they 
seek to place people. belonging to their 
own ethnic group in key positions, in 
strategic positions, so as to prepare a 
secure power base which serves as a 
springboard ro gain political ascendance. 
This disunity also manifem itself polit-
ically, inasmuch as they put forward po-
litical slogans to try to win rhe support of 
the broad masses of the people. But we 
should e~phasise that 1heir differences 
are e~sentially not ideological at alt. 
Ideologically they belong IO the same 
camp. 
Q. An economic plan has been dra'l.vn 
up with the collaboration of the United 
Stales government concerning economic 
guarantees for seHler5" after 1he forma-
tion of an African governmem in Zim-
babwe. What are your views on this plan? 
A. First of al!, this so-called economic 
plan is a direct result of the intensifica-
tion of the armed struggle in Zimbab\ e. 
The United States and other imperialist 
powers see their interests threatened and 
the are determined to stamp out the 
revolutionar flame before it 1s too late. 
The so-called economic plan aims at 
creating a socio-economic climate con-
ducive to the continued exploitation of 
the Zimbabwean people under "major-
ity" rule. 
e are to ally opposed to the so -called 
economic plan. 11 falls far shor of our ob-
jectives. e are not fighting for econ-
omic or political reforms. We are fighting 
for the total transformation of the Zim-
babwean society. 
To us the economic plan is doubly 
ridiculous. First, the United States wishes 
to pay compensation to the racists for the 
termination of their exploitation. Sec-
~~:~-- : -: ::. · st.-~ !.: ~~ ~L:t~= :':.... :;.. : ... : . 
v\ bi.i ;e ~:le LS ~O\ ernrr:ent it:-t:·li i: 0;.1;-)r('~-
sing miliions and mil lio•h of people in it, 
own country. The) I\OU id do better w 
make use of the money in alleviating the 
economic burden of the broad rr.asses in 
their own countr,, who live a liie far 
worse than that of Rhodesian whites. 
Q. Do you think anything will come our 
of Kissinger's and Vorster's "shutt le 
diplomacy" in Africa? 
A. They are definite! · "shunilng'' with a 
purpose, working ou t a plan tci sabota ge 
our struggle. \P\e 1hink the) will produce 
some formula aime.d at conta ining the 
struggle. But we are prepared for them 
and we are quite sure that whatever they 
do will fail. All their schemes will be 
stillborn. 
Q. What is ZIPA's attitude towards ele-
ments in the traditional leadership of the 
Zimbabwe nationalist movement who 
compromise themselves by supporting 
imperialist plans Lo continue the system 
of exploitation after majority rule? 
A. We are not racialists. We are not fight-
ing against the Smith regime simply be-
cause they are white. We are fighting 
against the system that they are perpe-
trating and defending. If any Zimbab-
weans collude with them in oppressing 
the Zimbabwean people we shall bundle 
them together, we shall make no distinc-
tion on the basis of colour. 
Q. How far has ZIPA gone in organising 
a political infrastructure inside. Zim-
babwe to mobilise the people? 
A. The masses are organised in units and 
they are democratically conducting their 
day-to-day business under the leadership 
o f ZIPA. In each uni we ha1.•e a section of 
dedicated people and we ha e also man-
aged to establish mass organisations- for 
students, for children, for women, 
peasants and workers. 
Q. Does this political structure extend 
into the cities? 
A. Our strategy has been that of fighting 
from the countryside, encircling the 
cities. as far as the rural areas are con-
cerned, this structure is quite organised. 
But because of the existing conditions it 
has not been possible for these organisa-
tions to come out into the open in the 
cities. They are still clandestine. But they 
are there. 
Q. What about the possibilities for urban 
guerrilla struggle? 
A. We do not conceive of urban guerilla 
warfare as being divorced from the 
guerrilla war we are carrying out in the 
countryside. Urban guerrilla arfare can 
only play a supplementary role to the 
guerrilla opera ions organised in the 
countryside. 
(cominued on page 6) 
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dcsia. But it \\as too l;;:e. E-.en .. r.:ode:ate 
states·· like Nigeria and Ghana saw 
through his feeble attempts and did not 
meet with him. Ho\\ did the L;.S. expect 
anyone to believe that they \\ere willing 
to end apartheid while at the same time 
they were dramatically accelerating the 
amount of new trade and investments in 
South Africa? Plus to many African 
leaders the Kissinger shuttle ·~ndicated 
that one of the purposes of his trip was to 
split the liberations movements and to 
create a situation similar to the Midde 
East. One of the main results of Kissin-
ger's "Shuttle Diplomacy" to the Middle 
East in 1975 was a split in the Arab 
Liberation Movements which is indicated 
in today's war in Lebanon. 
Un Aprrl 24, 197b, Henry Kissinger 
revealed the major portion of a ten point 
plan to force Rhodesia into Black major-
ity rule. The Black nations of Africa as 
well as the Black Congressional Caucus 
dared Kissinger to implement his plan 
and specifically the points that called for 
the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and 
the tightening of sanctions against the 
Rhodesian economy. The liberation 
forces had no need to settle for anything 
less than the immediate transfer of 
power. They saw through the Ford ad-
ministration's 'worry' about giving them 
"assistance to a secure future" and its 
'concern' for the civil rights of white 
Rhodesians as another stalling tactic. 
Throughout the summer as the sense 
of drama grew, Mr. Kissinger talked with 
various Africans as well as kept in close 
contact with South African Prime Min-
ister, John Vorster. The news media re-
ported that Mr. Kissinger would not meet 
with Ian Smith of Rhodesia unless Smith 
conceded to the fact that he would have 
to accept the future of Black majority 
rule. The African leaders of the border 
line countries who had met to discuss 
their role in the future of southern Africa 
and whether they would unite to fight 
the colonialist and their allies greeted 
Mr. Kissinger's plan with skepticism. Mr. 
Kissinger met with these leaders indi id-
ually. The resu lts were either bad or good 
depending upon which part of the news 
item you read. 
NEW STRATEGY 
As the daily press continued to try to 
confuse the American public, steps were 
taken to completely disregard the ten 
points that Kissinger had established 
earlier. If Kissinger's plan was adopted 
the racists would lose too much. Under 
the new strategy, no one would have to 
"force" Rhodesia to give up power. The 
white minority would seemingly "volun-
teer" it. The drama heightened when 
Prime Minister Ian Smith asked the Rho-
desian government for permission to 
meet with Mr. Kissinger. As the world 
held its breath, the Rhodesian govern-
ment gladly gave its consent to Mr. 
Smith, who coincidently was scheduled 
--, 
,, .. ;,::; ~··· .:.1 
to attend a rugb\ same in "0utl-. Africa 
the Sunda} Mr. Ki ,, inscr \\ as meeting in 
C2pe Town . After a fe\, hours of deliber-
ation. /\1r Smith said \ha: he would get 
back with Mr. Kissinger in a fev. davs. He 
first had to discuss the new plan with his 
countrymen. 
Friday, September 24, 1976, Ian Smith 
appeared before Rhodesian television 
audiences and said that he accepted the 
following points in his negotiations with 
Mr. Kissinger. • 
"1 . Rhodesia agrees to majorjty 'wvithin 
two years . 
2. Representatives of the Rhodesian 
government will meet immediately 
at a mutually agreed place with 
African leaders to organize an 
interim government to function 
until majority rule is implement,,~ 
3. The interim government should' 
consist of a council of state, half of 
whose members will be black and 
half white with a white chairman 
without a special vote. The Euro-
pean and African sides would 
nominate their representatives. It's 
functions will include: 
Legislation-general supervisory 
responsibilities-and supervis-
ing the process of dr.afting the 
constitution. 
The interim government should 
also have a council of ministers 
with a majority of Africans and 
an African first minister. For the 
period of the interim govern-
ment, the ministers of defense 
and of law and order would be 
white. Decisions of the council 
of ministers to be taken by two-
thirds majority. Its functions 
should include: delegate legisla-
tive authority and execute re-
sponsibility. 
..: 1 ;-'i c· ._ -.. • _:__·c r( i IL cl c.>i; ~ \', i; ; t: :~ ~ ct. 
enab:in:; iegi,lati;n for the process 
to majority rule . Upon enactment 
of that legislation, Rhodesia will 
also enact such legislation as may 
be necessary to the process. 
5. Upon the establishment of the 
interim government, sanctions will 
be lifted and all acts of war, includ-
ing guerrilla Warfare, will cease. 
6. Substantial economic support will 
be made available by the interna-
tional community to provide assu-
rance to Rhodesians about the 
economic future of the country. A 
trust fund will be established out-
side Rhodesia which will organize 
and finance a major international 
effort to respond to the economic 
opportunities of this country and 
to take effects of the changes 
taking place. The fund will , inter 
alia, support the internal and ex-
ternal economic circumstances of 
the country and provide develop-
mental assistance guarantees and 
investment incentives to a wide 
variety of projects. 
The aim will be to expand the 
industrial and mineral production 
of the country, to enhance agricul-
tural potential by suitable land 
utilization and development pro-
grams and to provide the neces-
sary training and educational facili-
ties to provide the essential flow of 
skills. 
Pension rights, the investment of 
the individual in his own home 
and/or farm and the remittances 
overseas of an individual's liquid 
resources with the levels yet to be 
stipulated will be guaranteed by 
the interim and subsequent go-
vernments. These particular mea-
sures will be underwritten by the 
trust fund thereby giving a firm 
international base to the govern-
ment guarantee." 
WHITE RULE MAINTAINED 
Is this or is this not an attempt to do 
egal pirating of the right to self-deter-
.·nination of the Zimbabwean peoples? 
Kissinger's plan is nothing but a blatant 
~tep to neo-colonialism. A trust fund set 
up outside of Rhodesia so that the racists 
will have total control. Continued expan-
sion of industrial and mineral production 
so that the capitalists countries can rape 
the land of all its resources for their 
profit. White Rhodesians have nothing to 
lose for their "sacrifice" of Black majority 
rule. They will be paid to settle in the 
Republic of South Africa if they wish to 
strengthen the racist system there. (This 
will only give them a little extra time 
because the African National Congress 
(ANC] will be victorious in South Africa.) 
/Continued on page 8) 
A Slack mayor ca lied for the formation 
of a ''Biack Think Tank"----intellectuals 
and A.frican exoert,----to formulate a solu-
tion for sou ihern- Africa. A p rom inent 
Black mini3ter wanted "to take a ea rn of 
journalists. ministe1>, labor leaders and 
poli1idans to 50U1h Africa , to see first 
hand what is happening." A group of 
concerned college students organized a 
collection to aid South African refugees 
fleeing to Bo~wana "because it's the 
on ly place he can go." 
All these effom indicate both the con-
cern and the confusion regarding the 
role of Afro-Americans in relation to the 
struggles in southern Africa. 
As Afro-Americans , we do have a re-
spomibility----in fact, an obligation- to 
do whatever is in our po er 10 help our 
brothers and sisters -gain their freedom. 
9ut we must at the same time be clear on 
exactly where our responsibilities lie and 
how we can be most effective in our aid. 
It is important to realize that we, Amer-
ican citizens, will not liberate Afri ca. This 
is the thing neither Henry Kissinger nor 
some Afro-Americans seem to under-
stand. The liberation movements of 
South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
have been waging war for many years 
and on many levels. They are the only 
forces which have a mandate from the 
African masses to win their freedom, 
whether by negotiation, armed struggle 
or both. It is they, not Kissinger or a 
"Black Think Tank," who will determine 
how freedom will come and what form it 
will take. Therefore, Afro-Americans 
must recognize the true libera!ion forces 
(those recognized by the United Nations 
( . .) and the Organization of African 
Unity (O.A.U.) and a/low them to deter-
mine how we can best serve their needs. 
We must work to influence the American 
public to support the liberation move-
ments of Southern Africa and to pressure 
the U.S. Government to withdraw its 
support of the white racist regimes of 
Southern Africa. The liberation move-
ments, through their United atlons 
spokespersons, have already asked very 
specific things ol those who are con-
cerned and wish to provide aid. They 
have asked for the complete isolation of 
the Rhodesian and South African govern-
ments from the world community until 
liberation is achieved. We must realize 
that the United States and the other cap-
italist countries are the primary reason 
that South Africa and Rhodesia continue 
to exist and oppress the Black majority by 
its suppQrt o f lan Smith and John orster. 
This means thar one of our tasks is to 
organize pressure groups to get U.S. cor-
porations out of South frica. We must 
pressure the U.S. government to end 
diplomatic ies wi h, and eliminate mon-
erary support for, the ors1er and Smith 
regimes. We must emphatically and ef-
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Soutn l\frica. panirniarl. when Afro-
American entertainers and sports figures 
are invo!\ ed. Re\. Jes,e Jackson of PUSH 
,-.an:s to conduct a "iact finding" tour to 
?outh Africa. The proposed trip is a slap 
in the face to the liberation movement of 
South Africa, which has already made all 
the facts available for anyone who is 
interes_t~d. The proposed trip is in direct 
oppos1t1on to the liberation movement's 
plea for total isolation of South Africa. 
SOUTH AFRICA IS THE PROBLEM 
The liberation movements have also 
requested monetary aid-to buy arms, 
food and other necessities. The group of 
students who organized a campaign to 
collect money to assist South African 
refugees in Botswana were earnest and 
concerned, but somewhat misguided. 
Aid to refu~ees can only be a stop-gap 
measure. Aid to the African National 
Congress of South Africa (South Africa's 
only liberation movement) would have a 
much broader impact. Helping refugees 
only helps eliminate one of the surface 
probl_erns ~f oppression. Contributing to 
~he liberation forces would go directly 
into the effort to eradicate colonialism 
and would help eliminate the need fo; 
South Africans to flee their rightful 
homelands. 
One must realize that the crux of the 
southern African problem is South Africa 
itself. The liberation movements of 
sou_thern Afri_ca, though fighting to free 
the_1r r_espect1ve countries, have always 
maintained that South Africa is the bas-
tion on which the racist colonial system 
of southern Africa depends for its sur-
vival. It was South Africa which enabled 
Portugese colonialism to survive as Io n< 
as it did. It is South Africa that J... •p 
Rhodesia from economic collapse when 
U.N. sanctions were applied. It is South 
Africa that illegally holds Namibia in its 
clutches. In fact. the whole reason for 
Kissinger's trip to South Africa is to bu 
time for South Africa, to allow that gov-
ernment to become stronger and better 
a ble o resist the revolutionary suroe that 
s engulfing southern Africa . Whe~"'south 
'\frica goes under. so wi ll the institution 
Jf colonia li sm. e must constantlv and 
:onspicuously through public pressure 
·emind Mr. Kissinger et al, that a "Rho-
::Jesian solution" will not solve the major 
problems in southern Africa . Only the 
destruction of the Vorster regime and the 
apartheid system will do that and im-
mediate majority rule in Rhodesia and 
South Africa. 
OUR RESPONSIBILITIES 
The liberation forces represent a 
people's movement, and are the spokes-
persons of the oppressed people that in 
che end will be victorious. Angola, 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have 
shown the effectiveness of a movement 
based on the people and not on a 
"Kissinger Plan" or puppet movements 
and South Africa will prove no exception. 
In Angola, it is a well-documented fact 
that the CIA created puppet" revolution-
ary" organizations to try to split the 
Angolan people. They were unsuccess-
ful. It will be up to us to insure that South 
African and Rhodesia's counterparts to 
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and Holden 
Roberto's FNLA are not created in the 
payroll of the U.S. federal government. 
As Afro-Americans, we also have a 
responsibility to ourselves: to relate the 
effect U.S. policies abroad have on our 
~v:'n situation. U.S. unemployment i! 
ming,_ bu~ U.S. corporations are locating 
factories in southern Africa (and other 
nations with facist regimes) because o1 
the extremely cheap labor supply. Oui 
taxes ar~ rising but the U.S. is pumping 
mone_y, in the form of loans, weapons 
mach_inery and technology, into the op· 
press1ve southern African regimes. ThE 
contradiction of the American position i! 
very clear: supposedly, the U.S. is work-
ing for majority rule and equal rights for 
all Rhodesian and South African citizens 
?ut cannot guarantee the same rights t~ 
its own. 
Our responsibility is full support of the 
southern African liberation movements 
an~. ~ot with any U.S. government plan; 
to Liberate Southern Africa." Our re-
sponsibility is not to support U.S. im-
perialism but to support the world-wide 
str~ggle against capitalist exploitation 
racism and U.S. agression. 
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Q. \'\:hat does ZIPA see as the objecti\,e 
of the recent Rhodesian massacre of 
more than 670 Zimbabwean refugees at 
Nyazonia in Mozambique? 
A. Principally, to internationalise the 
conflia. They hoped that the People's 
Republ ic of Mozambique would read 
rash ly and invade Rhodesia, which ould 
ha\e created a pretext lor Smith to call 
for support from his Western allies. 
At the same time the attack was also 
aimed at creating a rift between Frelimo 
and the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. It 
was meant to show that by supporting 
the Zimbabwean freedom fighters and 
accommodating Zimbabwean · refugees 
the Mozambican Government is actually 
inviting attacks by the Smith regime. The 
idea was to force the Mozambican Gov-
ernment to oppose the guerrillas by cre-
ating the idea that in an all-out war be-
tween Mozambique and Rhodesia , the 
young People's Republic would stand to 
lose. 
Q. Many Zimbabweans are fighting in 
the Smith regime's army. Why, and what 
is ZIPA's attitude to them? And are any of 
them deserting to join the Guerrillas? 
A. It is true that thousands of Zimbab-
weans are fighting in the racist regime's 
armv. This is because of blackmail and 
con~cription. The people are black-
mailed into serving the Smith regime in 
search of social security. They want to 
guarantee the security of their families, 
They want to earn a livelihood and have 
no alternative, wi1h all other employ-
ment opportunities denied them, but to 
serve within the racist army. It has also 
become dear of late that the Smith re-
gime is conscripting Africans into its army 
by force. 
ZJPA's attitude is that those who join 
Smith's arm}' are misguided Zimbab-
weans. They need to be doubl libera ed. 
Firsi they need to be liberated from the 
national oppression. They are oppressed 
just like any other Zimbabwean. Sec-
ondly, they need to be libera ed from the 
oppression they suffer within the raci st 
army. They occupy an inferior position in 
the racist army. So we sympathise with 
them. Our struggle is t o liberate all op-
pressed Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe to-
day. 
Recently the number of deserters from 
the racist army joining the ZIPA ranks has 
risen to astronomical proportions. Hun-
dreds and hundreds of them come to our 
ranks. Some of them with their weapons. 
Q. You said the black soldiers in the 
Rhodesian racist army are discriminated 
against. In what way? · 
A. About a couple of months ago the 
Smi th regime published the report at a 
commission o f inquir1 in o racial dis-
crimination. This re ealed qu ite candid! 
that the African soldiers in Smith's army 
C""' I I ,-"eop;e s 
ocrup~ a \ ~r~ inierior position in he 
en e that up to no v none of them ha 
risen to the position of an officer. all of 
:hem are either nnn -commis ioned of-
ficers or simply privates. So this in itself is 
tantamount to exploitation. 
In addition, there is racial discimina-
tion within the army itself. Some facilities 
that are available to whites are not avail-
able to African soldiers. And also Eur-
opean private !iOldiers do not !>how re-
spect 10 their -seniors who are Africans. 
In the Rhodesian racist army today, the 
most dangerous tasks are assigned to the 
Africans and , in most cases, the African 
soldiers are used as minesweepers and as 
reconnaisance personnel for the racist 
army. But of course the racist army also 
mistrusts the African soldiers very much. 
They doubt their loyalty. As such they 
cannot give them freedom of action to 
organise action against the guerrillas. 
They can only work under the super-
vision of their white superiors. 
Q. How does ZIPA define the enemy? 
What is the target of the freedom 
fighter's bullets? 
A. Clear· understanding of the character 
of our society, the nature of our revolu-
tion and the fundamental contradiction 
in o ur ociety i essemial to the definition 
of the enemy. O ur societ is es~en ially a 
colonial society and as such e have to 
wage a national democratic revolution to 
o erthrow national oppression. This na-
tional democratic revolution will serve to 
reconcile the principal contradiction in 
Zimbabwe which is characterised by the 
domination and oppression of the vast 
majority of the Zimbabwean people by a 
small, minority, racist, reactionar)' clique 
of whites. 
From this we can say that all those who 
are opposed to 1he liberation and the 
independence o f the Zimbabwean 
people are our enemies. These comprise 
the Smith racist regime, and the imperial -
ist powers that back it, puppet Africans 
serving the Smith regime, and all those 
who are opposed to the independence 
of the Zimbabwean people. The target of 
the freedom fighters' bullets is the system 
of exploitation and 1he capitalist enter-
prises and armed personnel which servE. 
to perpetuate it. 
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Position On Southern Africa 
The tollov- ing resolutions were passed bv thl 
Coali1ion oi Black Trade Unionist, ICBTU\ at 
their fifth annual comention held in Cleve-
land,. Ohio on Sept . 3-6, 1976. The CBTU 
represents ove 50 un ion; both in the AFL-CIO 
and other indeoendem unions of Black union 
leadership and ' rank and file members. -Ed. 
RESOLUTION NO. 28 
WHITE MINORITY GOVERNMENTS 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
pie's Republic of Angola in the United 
J\:ations. 
3. We of the CBTU believe that unless 
progress toward black majority rule is 
achieved the United States government 
should stop all economic, political, cultu-
ral, and sporting relations with South 
Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia. 
WHEREAS Over 120 countries voted in 
the 1974 General A,semblv of the United 
Nations to expel South Africa from the 
U.N. because of its continued violation of 
every human right and trade union right 
of the African workers guaranteed in the 
United Nations Charter; and 
WHEREAS Wages paid by U.S. compan-
ies to Blacks in South Africa remain at 
levels far below wages paid to whites 
performing similar work, 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT : 
WHEREAS: Southern Africa has com-
manded the attention of the world be-
cause of the suppression of Black major-
ity rights in Rhodesia, Namibia and South 
Africa - five million Black people in 
Rhodesia, two million Blacks in Namibia 
and · eighteen million Black South Afri-
cans are denied political, economic and 
human rights by the racist and rep ressive 
rule of the white minority govern ments 
of Rhodesia and South Africa; and 
1. We of the CBTU condemn the 
' murder of the unarmed peaceful demon-
strators by the South African government 
· 
1
~ police as they prot~s~ed non-violently f~r 
~ ~ basic human political and economic 
- .., 
1 rights; 
.3" r- :- ~: ·-: ~ .. 
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.WHEREAS: the Rhodesian government ;,- ·-; :., ·-.. 
is not recognized by any government in ~- ' r 
the world as being legitim~te, and it l !. • 
continues to defy the resolutions of the ~ 
United Nations and the Organization of l fi, f 
African Unity which call for Black major- .~ ~ .. ·-~ • ..., 
ity rule in Rhodesia. Further, the racist 
Rhodesian government is militarily en-
gaged in fighting the liberation move-
ments in that country and invading the 
bordering independent country of Mo-
zambique in an attempt to suppress the 
national liberation movement; and 
WHEREAS : the South African white 
minority government is illegally ruling 
the country of Namibia against the man-
date of the United Nations and Organiza-
tion of African Unity and against the will 
of the Namibian people; and 
WHEREAS: the people of Angola re-
cently won their freedom from Portu-
guese colon ialism on ovember 11, 1975 
despite the aggressive attempts b the 
South Afri can governmen , the United 
States governmen and other co untries to 
prevent that achievement by invading 
A ngo la and supporti ng the CIA su bver-
sive m aneuvers and mercenaries wh ich 
were responsible for hundreds of thou-
sands of deaths and widespread devasta-
tion of property. 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOlVED THAT: 
1. We of the CBTU call for Black 
majority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia, and 
South Africa, and that the trade union 
movement in the United States call upon 
the United States government to support 
and work for achieving Black majority 
rule in Southern Africa. 
2. We of the CBTU call upon the 
United States government to recognize 
and establish diplomatic relations with 
the People's Republic of Angola and for 
the United States to recognize the Pea-
RESOLUTION NO. 37-41 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
WHEREAS Over 300 unarmed Black 
South Africans have been murdered in 
the Republic of South Africa since June 
of 1976 by South African police while 
participating in non-violent peaceful 
demonstrations for their rights; and 
WHEREAS United States foreign poli-
:ies regarding Southern Africa are being 
formulated with very little advice or 
counsel from Afro-Americans; and 
WHEREAS Having examined the mate-
rial on apartheid in the Republic of South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) espe-
cially with regards to the situation of 
African workers and United States com-
panies in Southern Africa; and 
WHEREAS After studying the United 
Nations' reports on trade union activity 
in South Africa and the reports of the 
International Labor Organization of the 
United Nations; and 
2. We of the CBTU express full support 
of the just struggle of the Black South 
African people and the conclusion that 
the only solution for beace in South 
Africa is the ending of the inhumane 
system of apartheid and the establish-
ment of majority rule; 
3. We of the CBTU join with the 
United Nations and the Black people of 
South Africa in recognizing and support-
ing the African National Co ngress (ANC) 
of South Africa as the leg itimate voice of 
the oppressed South African majority; 
4. We of the CBTU call upon the trade 
union movement in the United States to 
vigorously condemn the apartheid sys-
tem and the murder of Black South Afri-
cans; 
5. We of the CBTU call for the withdra-
wal of United States corporations' invest-
ments in the Republic of South Africa. 
THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED 
THAT: 
1. We of the CBTU support efforts to 
give Afro-Americans direct and mean-
ingful input into the formulation of U.S. 
foreign policy toward Southern Africa 
through formal and informal discussions 
between Afro-American leaders, the Se-
cretary of State and other foreign policy 
makers; 
2, We of the CBTU support the right of 
Black South African workers to forrr 
trade unions of their choice to elect thei1 
leaders and to bargain collectively with 
their employers; 
3. We of the CBTU support the right of_ 
Black South African workers to form 
trade unions of their choice to elect their 
leaders and to bargain collectively with 
their employers; 
3. We of the CBTU support the non-
banned South African .Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU) the only trade union 
movement that is recognized by the 
Black South Africans and the United 
Nations; 
(continued on page 8) 
1. Socialism and the '\e1,\ ly lndependenr 
Natiom, by R. A. \'lyanovsky, Im-
ported Publications, 320 West Ohio 
St., Chica o 60670. Price: $4.00. An 
outline of the concepts and problems 
of national liberation movements and 
non-capitalist development and their 
relations to the socialist world. 
2. Economic Neo-Colonialism, by L.I. 
Kolchkovsky, Imported Publications, 
Chicago, Price: $3.50. A systematic 
examination of the wide variety of 
methods used by modern neo-
colonialists, their internal contradic-
tions and the newly independent 
countries' struggle against them. 
3. They Shall Nol Pass (The Autobio-
graphy of La Pasionaria), b Dolores 
lbarruri, International Publishers, 381 
Park Ave., South N.Y.C. 10016. The 
story of one of the most famous 
Spanish Communists and her struggle 
wi;h the working class against fascism. 
The book is also a call to the future to 
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SL:PER K RIDES AGAIN 
There is no seventh point that guarantees 
such econo;nic rewards for the Zimbab-
\\E-can majority for ha\ in" to suffer with 
white rule for all these y;ars Each step is 
a sham from one to six. It did not take the 
other southern African nations two years 
to have a complete transfer of power. In 
two years, many things could happen. 
There is no rationale for a council with a 
fifty percent white membership in a na-
tion that is overwhelmingly African. The 
council should be a true republic with 
the number of representatives reflecting 
the population. There is absolutely no 
need for a white person to head a council 
that is going to shape the future of a 
black nation. There is absolutely no need 
for the Minister of Law and Order and 
the Minister of Defense to be white (un-
less, like Mr. Kissinger you are intent 
upon prolonging white minority power). 
The fact that there was no input by the 
liberation forces makes this document 
among the most criminal, unorincipled 
and benighted documents e ,e'r. The fact 
that it calls for an end to international 
sanctions and cessation of guerrilla war-
fare, makes it ridiculous. If this is the 
proposal the capitalist countries present 
to bring about a peaceful transition. 
continued warfare is assured. 
Kissinger and Ford have f~oled no one 
with their non-attempt to 'establish' the 
nations of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This 
:~Ian will be criticized by the in.terna-
·~:>n_al c?mn:,unity _that sees through 
K1~smger s d,plomat1c guise. As Cuban 
Prime Minister Fidel Castro stated "I 
think all these maneuvers are mean~ to 
save something to prolong the racist 
r~gim;, in Zimbabwe for as long as pos~ 
s1_bl~. He further said that Henry 
Kissinger was trying to get "some kind of 
Harold Ro~er; . Editor 
Editorial Board 
Diane Ric h.ird; . Rudaki, Chukwa Dinohi, 
Linda MurrJ> 
·' o ·· ··\ ;, · ~•-7 '' •' ' ' · · t:~1.:Cl,J,,--: au~J,11ct,e ,rrVGSn nt:, ro -t? 1n 
t .. e talks. "At least the fact that the') 1the 
R_hodes1an gov~rnment) had to recog-
nize the necessity for majority rule is a 
revolutionary victory ... This victory was 
not achieved by peaceful means, but 
through armed struggle, so why should 
the guerrilla movements disarm now ... it 
is logical that the Africans will not accept 
the plan. The revolutionaries are in the 
better position ~?w. Why should they 
accept the cond1t1ons set up by a racist 
~overnment which will keep control of 
:he army and the police? ... who knows 
what may happen in two years?" 
(Continued from page lJ 
Black Trade Unionists 
4. We of the CBTU call upon the tradt 
~nio~ movement to take a strong posi-
tion m condemning the recent brutal 
killing of Black South Africans and that 
the trade union movement in the U.S. 
should state its support for majority rule 
in South Africa; 
_ 5. We of the CBTU call for the expul-
SJOn of the Republic of South Africa from 
the United Nations; 
6. We of the CBTU call for the boycott 
of diamonds and other metals from 
South Africa into the U.S.; 
7. We of the CBTU call upon the Cong. 
Black Caucus to hold public hearings in 
the U.S. on the situation in South Africa 
and on U.S. policy in South Africa;. 
8. We of the CBTU will make a mone-
tary contribution to the United Nation~ 
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